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1. Introduction
In this paper we reconsider the problem of axiomatizing scoring rules. Early results
on this problem are due to Smith (1973) and Young (1975). They characterized social
welfare and social choice functions, respectively, as scoring rules with four basic axioms:
anonymity, neutrality, consistency (or separability, or reinforcement) and continuity (or
Archimedian, or overwhelming majority). Following them, Myerson (1995) showed that
essentially the same set of axioms characterize scoring rules even if some of the assump-
tions of Smith (1973) and Young (1975) are weakened.
Our objective in this paper is to point out an important detail that has seemingly been
ignored in this literature: in the special case of two alternatives the continuity axiom in
Young (1975) is redundant in the axiomatization of scoring rules. Hence, our main result
is (Theorem 2 in Sect. 3:1) "When there are two alternatives, a social choice function is
anonymous, neutral and consistent if and only if it is a simple scoring function." We also
show that the same result holds, i.e. the smaller set of axioms characterize this voting
rule when indi⁄erences are allowed in the voters￿preferences (Theorem 3 in Sect. 3:2).
Moreover, from this result we derive another result (Theorem 4 in Sect. 3:2) that can be
seen as a variant of May￿ s theorem in May (1952), and hence establish a formal connection
between the two classic results, Young￿ s Theorem and May￿ s Theorem. Finally, we also
show that in each of our results, axioms of neutrality and cancellation property can be
used interchangeably (Proposition 1 and 2).
In the next section we introduce our notation and the main de￿nitions. Section 3
gives the main results and the last section concludes.
2. The preliminaries
Let Rn denote the set of all n-tuples of real numbers and let Rn
+ be its nonnegative
orthant. The notions of weak (and associated indi⁄erence relation) and strict preferences
over a set B are de￿ned as usual and when a 2 B is weakly, strictly preferred and
indi⁄erent to b 2 B, we write a & b;a ￿ b and a ￿ b, respectively. A transposition on
set B = fa;bg, that is a permutation that exchanges the roles of a and b, is denoted as
a ￿ b.
Our main setting follows closely that of Young (1975). Let A = fa1;:::;amg be the set
of alternatives. Let N denote the set of nonnegative integers which constitute names for
the voters and let P be the set of all preference orders (strict) on A. For any ￿nite V ￿ N,
a pro￿le is a function from V to P and a social choice function (SCF) is a function from
set X of all pro￿les to the family of non-empty subsets of A;2Anf;g. A SCF is said to be
anonymous if it depends only on the number of voters associated with each preference
order. We can represent the domain of an anonymous SCF by Nm!, i.e. the set of all
m!-tuples with nonnegative integer coordinates, indexed by P, where for any x 2 Nm! and
any p 2 P;xp represents the number of voters having preference order p. Let Sm be the
group of permutations of the index set f1;2;:::;mg. Each ￿ 2 Sm induces permutations
of the alternatives (which we also denote by ￿), and hence pro￿les, in the natural way.
We say that SCF is neutral if f ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ f for all ￿ 2 Sm. An anonymous SCF f is
consistent if 8x0;x00 2 Nm! such that f(x0) \ f(x00) 6= ;, f(x0 + x00) = f(x0) \ f(x00), and
it is continuous if whenever f(x) = faig, 8y 2 Nm! there is a su¢ ciently large integer n
such that f(y + n0x) = faig for n0 ￿ n.
We say that a SCF f has the cancellation property if whenever x is a pro￿le such that
the number of voters preferring ai to aj equals that of preferring aj to ai for all pairs
707Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 706-714
ai 6= aj, then f(x) = A. A SCF is a simple scoring function, denoted by fs, if there is a
vector s = (s1;:::;sm) 2 Rm of scores such that for any given pro￿le, it assigns a score of
si to each voter￿ s i0th most preferred alternative and chooses the alternative(s) with the
highest total score at that pro￿le.1 A SCF is trivial (f￿) if 8x 2 Nm!;f￿(x) = A. Note
that f￿ is a simple scoring function with s = (0;:::;0).
The following result is known as Young￿ s Theorem (Theorem 1:(ii) in Young, 1975):
Theorem 1 Let f be a SCF. Then, f is anonymous, neutral, consistent and continuous
if and only if it is a simple scoring function.
3. The axioms for scoring rules when m = 2
3.1. Two remarks on Young￿ s theorem
Before we consider the case of m = 2, we prove the following Lemma which holds for
any ￿nite m.
Lemma 1 Suppose f is an anonymous, neutral and consistent SCF. Then,
(a) f is either trivial or it contains all the singletons of 2Anf;g in its range:
8ai 2 A, 9x 2 Nm! such that f(x) = faig.
(b) Let e = (1;:::;1) 2 Nm!. Then, 8n 2 N, f(ne) = A.
Proof. (a) Note that when m = 1 the result is trivial. Suppose m ￿ 2. We show
that R(f), the range of f, includes at least one singleton faig. Then, the result follows
by neutrality. When m = 2, the claim is trivial since f 6= f￿ immediately implies that
9x 2 N2! such that f(x) = faig for some ai 2 fa1;a2g. Let m ￿ 3 and suppose R(f)
does not contain any singleton. Then, we claim that it can￿ t have any 2-element sets,
3-element sets,..., (m ￿ 1)-element sets. Because if R(f) has a 2-element set fai;ajg,
then by neutrality it has another 2-element set fai;akg. Then for x0 2 f￿1(fai;ajg)
and x00 2 f￿1(fai;akg), consistency implies that f(x0 + x00) = faig, which is a singleton.
Hence, we reach to a contradiction. Similarly, we conclude that R(f) can￿ t have any
k-element sets, for 3 ￿ k < m. But then, f = f￿.
(b) We show that f(e) = A. Then the result follows by consistency. Note that
e 2 Nm! is invariant under all permutations in Sm. Then f(e) must be so by neutrality.
But in 2Anf;g, the only set with that property is A.
We remark here that Lemma 1 (b) is already established in Young (1975). Let us
now consider the case of m = 2. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2 Let m = 2 and let f be a SCF. Then, f is anonymous, neutral and consistent
if and only if it is a simple scoring function.
Proof. Since the IF part is easy to verify we prove the ONLY IF part. For any x =
(x1;x2) 2 N2 ￿ R2
+, let x1 be the number of voters with preference p1 : a1 ￿ a2 and let
x2 be that with p2 : a2 ￿ a1. We shall partition N2 ￿ R2
+ as follows:
D = fx 2 N
2 : x1 = x2g;
D
0 = fx 2 N
2 : x1 > x2g;
D
00 = fx 2 N
2 : x1 < x2g:
1Note that scoring rules constitute rather general class of voting procedures. In particular, the
possibility of assigning lower scores to more preferred alternatives is allowed.
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Then by Lemma 1 (b);8x 2 D;f(x) = fa1;a2g. We claim that 8x0 2 D0;f(x0) = f(1;0).
Suppose 9x0 2 D0 such that f(x0) = f(1;0). Then, by consistency
f(x











2 + 1) = f(1;0):
Hence, for any such x0 2 D0, its two immediate neighbors, one on the right side and one









A if x 2 D
fa1g if x 2 D0








A if x 2 D
fa2g if x 2 D0
fa1g if x 2 D
00
:
Since f1 and f2 correspond to fs with s1 > s2 and s1 < s2 respectively, the proof is
completed.
Let us show that one can use the axioms of neutrality and cancellation property
interchangeably in Theorem 2.
Proposition 1 Let m = 2 and let f be an anonymous and consistent SCF. Then, f has
cancellation property if and only if it is neutral.
Proof. IF: We have shown in Lemma 1 (b) that anonymity, consistency and neutrality
imply that, 8x 2 D;f(x) = fa1;a2g. Since m = 2, any pro￿le x 2 N2 is such that the
number of voters who prefers a1 ￿ a2 is same as that of who prefers a2 ￿ a1; if and only
if x 2 D. Hence, f satis￿es the cancellation property.
ONLY IF: Suppose f satis￿es anonymity, consistency and cancellation property, but
not neutrality: 9y 2 N2 such that f ￿ ￿0(y) 6= ￿0 ￿ f(y) for some ￿0 2 S2. The only
candidate for such ￿0 2 S2 is ￿0 : a1 ￿ a2. Note that if one of f ￿ ￿0(y) 2 2Anf;g
and f(y) 2 2Anf;g is A, then consistency implies that they both must be A, since
￿0(y) + y 2 D and by cancellation property, f(￿0(y) + y) = A. But then f ￿ ￿0(y) =
￿0 ￿ f(y) = A which contradicts to our assumption. Hence, none of f ￿ ￿0(y) 2 2Anf;g
and f(y) 2 2Anf;g is A. Suppose f ￿￿0(y) = faig and f(y) = fajg for i;j 2 f1;2g;i 6= j.
Then f￿￿0(y) = ￿0￿f(y) = faig, which is a contradiction. Hence, the only possibility left
is f ￿ ￿0(y) = f(y) = faig for some i 2 f1;2g. Then by consistency f(￿0(y) + y) = faig,
which contradicts to cancellation property. This completes our proof.
In our opinion, redundancy of the continuity axiom in Theorem 1 when m = 2 is
not so obvious until one proves Theorem 2. However, one can also verify it directly
from Theorem 1.(i) in Young (1975) which states that a SCF is anonymous, neutral and
consistent if and only if it is a (composite) scoring function. Provided that Theorem
1.(i) is proven, it su¢ ces to notice that when m = 2, a composition g = fs2 ￿ fs1 of two
simple scoring functions fs1;fs2, de￿ned as g(x) = fs1(x) if fs1(x) ￿ A is a singleton set,
709Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 706-714
otherwise apply fs2 to break the ties in fs1(x), is a simple scoring function. Note that
there are two possibilities: either fs1 is trivial or it is not. Suppose fs1 = f￿. Then, since
g = fs2 ￿ f￿ = fs2, g is a simple scoring function. Now suppose fs1 6= f￿. Then, since
when m = 2;fs1(x) produces ties if and only if x 2 D and since fs2(x) = A for x 2 D,
we conclude that g = fs1, hence g is a simple scoring function.
3.2. Allowing for indi⁄erences in voters￿preferences
Let us now change our initial setting by allowing indi⁄erences in the individual￿ s
preferences, hence enlarging the domain of SCF. Sets A;Sm and N are de￿ned as above
in Sect. 2. Let W be the set o⁄all weak preference orders on A. For any ￿nite V ￿ N, an
extended pro￿le is a function from V to W and an extended social choice function (ESCF)
is a function from set Y of all extended pro￿les to the set 2Anf;g. An ESCF is said to
be anonymous if it depends only on the number of voters associated with each preference
order. We can represent the domain of an anonymous ESCF by N#W. The notions of
neutrality, consistency and cancellation property for an ESCF are de￿ned analogously to
that for a SCF.
Since scoring rules are initially de￿ned for pro￿les with strict preferences in Sect. 2, it
needs to be generalized. As we are eventually interested in the case of m = 2, we impose
a rather weak condition in our generalization: whenever alternatives are indi⁄erent to
each others at a given preference they must receive the same score (for a more speci￿c
generalization which applies to the case of any ￿nite m, see Vorsatz, 2008). So when
m = 2, an ESCF is a simple scoring function, denoted by F s, if there is a vector s =
(s1;s2;s3) 2 R3 of scores such that for any given pro￿le, it assigns a score of si to each
voter￿ s i0th strictly most preferred alternative, for i = 1;2, and assigns a score of s3 to
each voter￿ s indi⁄erent alternatives, and chooses the alternative(s) with the highest total
score at that pro￿le. An ESCF is trivial (F ￿) if 8x 2 N#W;F ￿(x) = A. Note that when
m = 2, F ￿ is a simple scoring function with s = (0;0;0).
Theorem 3 Let m = 2 and let F be an ESCF. Then, F is anonymous, neutral and
consistent if and only if it is a simple scoring function.
Proof. IF: F s is clearly anonymous since the outcome of F s depends only on the total
scores and that in turn depends only on the number of voters associated with each
preference. F s is neutral since exchanging the roles of a1 and a2 is same as exchanging
the total scores received by each. F s is consistent since the total score received by ai
under x + y 2 N3 is the sum of the scores received under each of x;y 2 N3, for any
x;y 2 N3 and i = 1;2.
ONLY IF: For any x = (x1;x2;x3) 2 N3 ￿ R3
+, let x1;x2 and x3 be the number of
voters with the preferences p1 : a1 ￿ a2;p2 : a2 ￿ a1 and p3 : a1 ￿ a2, respectively. We
shall partition N3 ￿ R3
+ as follows:
D3 = fx 2 N
3 : x1 = x2;x3 2 Ng;
D
0
3 = fx 2 N
3 : x1 > x2;x3 2 Ng;
D
00
3 = fx 2 N
3 : x1 < x2;x3 2 Ng:
Firstly, note that 8x 2 D3;F(x) = fa1;a2g since x 2 D3 is invariant under all permuta-
tions in S2 (recall that the indi⁄erence relation is symmetric) and by neutrality so must
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be F(x). But the only set with that property in fa1g;fa2g and fa1;a2g is the very last
one.
Let Pn ￿ N3 be de￿ned as follows: 8n 2 N;Pn = fx 2 N3 : x1;x2 2 N;x3 = ng.
We claim that for n ￿ 1, if F(x) = F(1;0;0), 8x 2 Pn￿1 \ D0
3, then F(x) = F(1;0;0),
8x 2 Pn \ D0
3. Suppose y 2 Pn￿1 \ D0
3 and F(y) = F(1;0;0). Then by consistency,
F(y + (0;0;1)) = F(y) = F(1;0;0) since (0;0;1) 2 D3 and F(0;0;1) = A. But for
n ￿ 1;Pn = fx 2 N3 : x = y + (0;0;1);y 2 Pn￿1g and this proves our claim.
Recall that we already showed in the proof of Theorem 2 that F(x) = F(1;0;0),
8x 2 P0\D0
3. Hence, we conclude that 8x 2 D0
3;F(x) = F(1;0;0), and then by neutrality,
8x 2 D00
3;F(x) = F(0;1;0). To complete the proof, suppose F 6= F ￿, then F includes all
singletons in its range since F 6= F ￿ implies that 9x 2 N3 such that F(x) = faig for some
ai 2 A and hence by neutrality, 9xi 2 N3 such that F(xi) = faig, for i = 1;2. Combining






A if x 2 D3
fa1g if x 2 D0
3









A if x 2 D3
fa2g if x 2 D0
3




Since F1 and F2 correspond to F s with s1 > s2 and s1 < s2 respectively, the proof is
completed.
Let us now derive a variant of May￿ s theorem from Theorem 3 above. First, we need to
introduce some more properties for anonymous ESCFs. For any extended pro￿le x 2 N3,
let N(ai;x) 2 N be the number of voters who prefers (weakly) ai to aj at x 2 N3, for




faig if N(ai;x) > N(aj;x)
fa1;a2g if N(ai;x) = N(aj;x)




faig if N(ai;x) < N(aj;x)
fa1;a2g if N(ai;x) = N(aj;x)
for i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j. Finally, anonymous ESCF is positive responsive to voter addition
(positive responsiveness) if whenever ai 2 F(x) for x 2 N3, and y 2 N3 is obtained from
x 2 N3 by adding one more voter with preferences of ai ￿ aj, we have F(y) = faig, for
i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j. The second part of the following result is a variant of May￿ s Theorem
(May (1952)):
Theorem 4 Let m = 2 and let F be an ESCF. Then,
(a) F is anonymous, neutral and consistent if and only if it is either trivial, or a simple
majority rule, or an inverse majority rule and
(b) F is anonymous, neutral and positive responsive if and only if it is a simple majority
rule.
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Proof. Since the IF parts are easy we prove the ONLY IF parts.
(a) By de￿nition, F1 and F2 in the proof of Theorem 3 correspond to simple majority
rule and inverse simple majority rule, respectively.
(b) We present two proofs.
1. Let us show that positive responsiveness with anonymity and neutrality imply
consistency. From the proof of Theorem 3, we know that anonymity and neutrality imply
that, 8x 2 D3;F(x) = fa1;a2g. For any x = (x1;x2;x3) 2 N3, let xD3 2 D3 be de￿ned as
xD3 = (minfx1;x2g;minfx1;x2g;x3). We can write x as x = xD3 + (x ￿ xD3). We claim
that F(x) = F(x￿xD3). Note that if x 2 D3, then F(x) = F(0) = A, hence the claim is
true. Suppose x = 2 D3. Then one can generate x 2 N3 from xD3 2 D3 and x ￿ xD3 2 N3
from 0 2 D3 by one and the same procedure: if x1 > x2, adding jx1 ￿ x2j > 0 voters, one
at a time, who strictly prefers a1 to a2, if otherwise adding the same number of voters
with the reverse preferences. Then, by positive responsiveness, F(x) = F(x￿xD3) as we
claimed, and moreover, F(x) = A if and only if x = xD3 2 D3.
Suppose x;y 2 N3 are such that F(x) \ F(y) 6= ;. We can express as F(x) \ F(y) =
F(x ￿ xD3) \ F(y ￿ yD3). Let z = x + y and notice that zD3 = xD3 + yD3, since
the ￿ min￿operator is additive. Hence, F(z) = F(xD3 + yD3 + (x ￿ xD3) + (y ￿ yD3)) =
F((x￿xD3)+(y￿yD3)). We claim that F((x￿xD3)+(y￿yD3)) = F(x￿xD3)\F(y￿yD3).
Notice that if at least one of x;y is in D3, then the claim is established: if x 2 D3, then
x = xD3 and F(x ￿ xD3) = A. Suppose x;y = 2 D3. Then, F(x ￿ xD3) \ F(y ￿ yD3) 6= ;
implies F(x ￿ xD3) = F(y ￿ yD3) = faig for some i 2 f1;2g. By positive responsiveness,
that is only possible if minfx1;x2g = xj and minfy1;y2g = yj for j 2 f1;2g and j 6= i.
Then by positive responsiveness, F((x￿xD3)+(y ￿yD3)) = faig since one can generate
(x￿xD3)+(y ￿yD3) 2 N3 from 0 2 D3 by adding (xi ￿xj)+(yi ￿yj) many voters with
strict preferences of ai ￿ aj. Hence, our second claim is established, which then implies
that F is consistent.
Then, the result in part (a) implies that F is one of F ￿;F1 and F2. But none of F ￿
and F2 satis￿es positive responsiveness. Hence, F = F1 which is the simple majority rule.
2. The proof above is rather indirect and a more direct proof is as follows. We know
that anonymity and neutrality imply that, 8x 2 D3;F(x) = fa1;a2g. We claim that
8x0 2 D0








Then, F(x￿) = fa1;a2g. We can generate x0 from x￿ by adding (x0
1 ￿ x0
2) voters, one at
a time, with the preferences of a1 ￿ a2. Then by positive responsiveness, F(x0) = fa1g.
Hence, 8x0 2 D0




00) = fa2g, which imply
that F = F1, which is the simple majority rule.
May (1952) axiomatizes majority rule with anonymity, neutrality and strong monotonic-
ity. The main di⁄erence between May￿ s Theorem and Theorem 4 (b) is, May (1952)
considers a ￿xed electorate setting while we consider a variable electorate setting. Then,
the axiom of positive responsiveness to voter addition should be seen as a modi￿cation
of the strong monotonicity axiom to the new setting.2
Let us show that one can use cancellation property axiom instead of neutrality in
Theorem 3 and 4.
Proposition 2 Let m = 2 and let F be an anonymous ESCF. Then,
2Strictly speaking, positive responsiveness to voter addition can not be stated in the original setting
with ￿xed electorate. But it captures the underlying idea of the strong monotonicity axiom, and hence
Theorem 4 (b) can be seen as a variant of May￿ s Theorem.
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(a) If F is consistent then it has cancellation property if and only if it is neutral, and
(b) If F has cancellation property and is positive responsive then it is consistent.
Proof. (a) IF: We have shown in the proof of Theorem 3 that anonymity, consistency
and neutrality imply that, 8x 2 D3;F(x) = A. Since m = 2, any pro￿le x 2 N3 is such
that the number of voters who prefers a1 & a2 is same as that of who prefers a2 & a1, if
and only if x 2 D3. Hence, F satis￿es the cancellation property.
ONLY IF: Let FjP0 be restriction of F into P0 = fx 2 N3 : x1;x2 2 N;x3 = 0g ￿ N3.
Note that FjP0 is a SCF and since F satis￿es anonymity, consistency and cancellation
property, so is FjP0. Then by Proposition 1, we conclude that FjP0 satis￿es neutrality.
Note also that by cancellation property, F(0;0;1) = A, which implies that F(0;0;x3) = A
for all x3 ￿ 1, by consistency. Then, we conclude that 8x = (x1;x2;x3) 2 N3 such that
x3 ￿ 1;F(x1;x2;x3) = F(x1;x2;0) = FjP0(x1;x2) since F(x1;x2;x3) = F(x1;x2;0) +
F(0;0;x3) = F(x1;x2;0), where the last equality follows by consistency. Then, 8x 2
N3;8￿ 2 S2;F ￿ ￿(x) = FjP0 ￿ ￿(x) = ￿ ￿ FjP0(x1;x2) = ￿ ￿ F(x) since the ￿rst and the
last equality follows by our second conclusion, while the second equality follows by our
￿rst conclusion, and hence F is neutral.
(b) We prove the statement indirectly showing that anonymity, cancellation property
and positive responsiveness imply that F = F M. By de￿nition, cancellation property
implies that 8x 2 D3;F(x) = fa1;a2g. Repeating the same argument as above in the
second proof of Theorem 4 (b), we conclude that, by positive responsiveness, 8x0 2
D0















3) 2 D3. Then,
F(x￿) = fa1;a2g. We can generate x




1) voters, one at a time,
with the preferences of a2 ￿ a1. Then by positive responsiveness, F(x





00) = fa2g. So, F = F M and hence, it is consistent.
4. Final comments
When it is presented Young￿ s Theorem is often accompanied by the following remark:
"its proof is di¢ cult and omitted" (see for instance, Chap. 9 in Moulin, 1988). However,
the above analysis shows that in the special case of voting over two alternatives it can
easily be proved. One may also wonder whether the axiom of continuity can be eliminated
when there are more than two alternatives. The answer to this question is negative
since the example of a (composite) scoring function satisfying the axioms of anonymity,
neutrality and consistency but not continuity, given in Sect. 3 of Young (1975), can easily
be extended to the case of any ￿nite (but more than three) alternatives. This observation
implies that any such elimination contradicts Theorem 1 in Young (1975).
It may seem that the setting with two alternatives is rather restrictive, especially
in the context of scoring rules. However, note that the analysis of this simple case
can shed a light on possible extensions of some of the axiomatization results in voting
theory. For instance, as majority rule and approval voting (AV) coincide when m = 2,
the result in Theorem 4 (a) is related to the axiomatization of AV in Fishburn (1978).
In the simple case it is easy to see that the axioms of neutrality and cancellation can
be used interchangeably (see Proposition 2). On the other hand, Alos-Ferrer (2006)
shows that one can drop neutrality in the presence of anonymity, consistency, cancellation
and faithfulness in Fishburn (1978)￿ s axiomatization of AV. Hence, Alos-Ferrer (2006)￿ s
result can be seen as an extension of Theorem 4 (a). Finally, note also that Theorem
4 (a) admits another extension: one can keep neutrality and drop cancellation in the
axiomatization of AV, which is, to my best knowledge, an open question.
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